The long term effect of teachers' pay for performance is of particular interest, as critics of these schemes claim that they encourage teaching to the test or orchestrated cheating by teachers and schools. In this paper, I address these concerns by examining the effect of teachers' pay for performance on long term human capital outcomes, in particular attainment and quality of higher education, and labor market outcomes at adulthood, in particular employment and earnings. I base this study on an experiment conducted a decade and a half ago in Israel and present evidence that the pay for performance scheme increased a wide range of long run human capital measures. Treated students are 4.3 percentage points more likely to enroll in a university and to complete an additional 0.17 years of university schooling, a 60 percent increase relative to the control group mean. These gains are mediated by overall improvements in the high school matriculation outcomes due to the teachers' intervention at 12th grade. The pay scheme led also to a significant 7 percent increase in annual earnings, to a 2 percent reduction in claims for unemployment benefits, and a 1 percent decline in eligibility for the government disability payment.
Introduction
It is important examining the long term effect of teachers' pay for performance schemes because skeptics often claim that they only improve students' test scores by encouraging 'teaching to the test' practices or orchestrated cheating by teachers and schools. Specifically, it is claimed there is no actual improvement in human capital because teachers do not respond to pay incentives by promoting broad human capital acquisition. Instead, they focus on improving students' test taking ability; on testing preparation sessions at the expense of teaching material not included in the exam; on strategies of answering exam questions such as multiple choice questions, and on skills and actions that raise scores on the formulas used to reward teachers.
1 Concerns about narrowly targeted gains are heightened if those gains are focused on areas where labor market rewards are due to signaling rather than human capital acquisition.
To address this key issue, I examine the effect of high school teachers' pay for performance on students' long term human capital outcomes, in particular attainment and quality of higher education, and labor market outcomes at adulthood, in particular employment and earnings. I take advantage of a teachers' pay for performance experiment which I conducted almost a decade and half ago in Israel (Lavy, 2009 ) in which I analyzed the short-term effects of this experiment on students' cognitive schooling outcomes. This earlier research now presents an unusual opportunity to evaluate whether an intervention that offered performance-based bonuses to teachers for students' test achievements has had a long-term impact on adult well-being.
This paper provides the first evidence of links between teachers' pay for performance during high school and students' schooling and labor market outcomes during their late 20's and early 30's. I examine the impact on various long-term outcomes, including post-secondary educational attainment and quality, employment, earnings, and different dimensions of social behavior (e.g., eligibility for and amount of welfare allowances, marriage, and fertility). Some of these outcomes, for example marriage and fertility, can also be viewed as potential mechanisms for the effect of the intervention on employment and earnings.
The evidence I present in this paper shows that the pay for performance scheme improved a wide range of long-run human capital measures. A decade after the end of the intervention, treated students are 4.3
percentage points more likely to enroll in a university and to complete an additional 0.17 years of university schooling, a 60 percent increase relative to the control group mean. The road to higher university enrollment and completed years of schooling was paved by the overall improvement in high school matriculation outcomes due to the teachers' intervention. The higher passing rate and average score in the Math and English matriculation exams, which were directly targeted by the intervention, led also to improved average matriculation outcomes, such as earning a matriculation diploma and the overall composite matriculation score. These two outcomes determine admission to post-secondary schooling and to various academic programs, especially at universities. For example, obtaining a Bagrut diploma is a pre-requisite for admission to universities, and enrollment in selective study programs such as medicine, engineering, and computer science is based on the Bagrut composite score, and on completing Math and English courses at an advanced level. The teachers' bonuses program increased the Bagrut composite score by 2.9 points and the Bagrut graduation rate by 5.5 percentage points. Other dimensions of the matriculation study program that signal quality of schooling were also improved: in particular the number of science credit units increased by 26 percent and the number of subjects studied at advanced level increased by 5 percent. These improvements, along with the increase in university schooling, led to a large increase in earnings at age 28-30: a decade after the experiment ended, treated students experienced a 7 percent increase in earnings relative to the control group. I also estimate that the teachers' program led to a reduction of 2 percent (a 33 percent decline) in eligibility for unemployment benefits, and a 1 percent decline in eligibility for government disability transfers (a 50 percent decline). I did not find, however, any effect of the intervention on marriage and parenthood rates.
The lessons from this analysis have meaningful external validity and can be easily transferred and applied to other educational settings in developed countries. Both the high school system in Israel and its high-stakes exit exams are very similar to those in other countries. Importantly, variants of the teachers' pay for performance intervention studied here have been implemented in recent years in developed and developing countries. Therefore, this study contributes to the accumulation of empirical evidence that provides a more complete picture of the returns to educational interventions, which can improve the effectiveness of spending on education. Another important advantage of the evidence presented here is that teachers' pay for performance is an intervention that can be directly manipulated by public policy, which is preferable to evidence based on measures such as school or teacher quality, which are not easily measured or manipulated by policy.
This paper contributes to a recent literature on the long-term effects of educational programs. Earlier studies focused on the long-term effects of compulsory schooling laws on adult educational attainment (Angrist and Krueger, 1991) and on adult health (Lleras-Muney, 2005) , for example. More recent studies have targeted schooling programs aimed at improving the quality of education in addition to increasing attainment. Most of these studies have centered on the evaluation of short-term outcomes, primarily standardized test scores, as a measure of success. Nevertheless, an equally persistent question is the extent to which educational interventions lead to long-term improvements in well-being -measures assessed not by attainment on tests but attainment in life. Puzzling and conflicting results from several evaluations make this a highly salient issue. Two small-scale, intensive preschool experiments produced large effects on contemporaneous test scores that quickly faded (Schweinhart et al., 2005; and Anderson, 2008) . Nonexperimental evaluations of Head Start, a preschool program for poor children, revealed a similar pattern, with test-score effects gone by middle school. But in each of these studies, treatment effects re-emerged in adulthood in the form of increased educational attainment, enhanced labor market attachment, and reduced crime (Deming, 2009; Garces et al., 2002; Ludwig and Miller, 2007) . Other studies have shown evidence for the effect of childhood investments on postsecondary attainment Whitmore 2001, Dynarski et al., 2011) . Very recently, Chetty et al. (2014) examined the long-term effect of value-added measures of teacher quality in a large urban school district in the United States, and reported significant effects on earnings at age 27, even though the effect on test scores had faded away much earlier. In contrast, Dustmann et al. (2012) found that attending a better school in Germany had no effect on school attainment or labormarket outcomes. However, there are no studies that focus on the long-term effect of teachers' performance pay programs, even though there is much uncertainty about the long term gains from such programs.
Determining which interventions achieve better long-term outcomes is critical for improving the efficiency of education and school resource allocation.
The remainder of my paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the Pay for Performance Experiment and the identification and econometric model. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
The Pay for Performance Experiment
Teacher incentive programs are increasingly popular. Performance-related pay for teachers is being introduced in many countries, amidst much controversy and opposition from teachers and unions. The rationale for these programs is the notion that incentive pay may motivate teachers to improve their performance (Lazear (2000 (Lazear ( , 2001 , Lavy (2002 Lavy ( , 2007 , Neal (2011 ), Duflo et al. (2012 ). Opponents of teacher incentive programs argue that schools may respond to test score-based incentives in perverse ways such as cheating in grading and teaching to the test (Glewwe et al (2010 ), Neal (2011 ) so that any performance gains are short-lived and there is no long-term accumulation of human capital. Even though there is some evidence that performance pay for teachers has significant short-term learning benefits, their critique is focused on harmful long-term effects, although the evidence is scanty. The evidence presented in this paper fills this gap with results on a wide array of lifetime outcomes.
The Teachers' Incentive Experiment
In early December 2000, the Ministry of Education unveiled a new teachers' bonus experiment in 49
Israeli high schools that I designed and helped to implement. The main feature of the program was an individual performance bonus paid to teachers on the basis of their own students' achievements. The experiment included all English, Hebrew, Arabic, and Mathematics teachers who taught classes in grades 10 through 12 leading to matriculation exams in these subjects in June 2001. The ranking was based on the difference between the actual outcome and a value predicted on the basis of a regression that controlled for the students' study program and socioeconomic characteristics, and a fixed school level effect. Separate regressions were used to compute the predicted pass rate and mean score, and each teacher was ranked twice -once for each outcome -using the size of the residual from the regressions. All teachers whose students' mean residual was positive in both outcomes were divided into four ranking groups, from first place to fourth. The first place award was $7,500; second place, $5,750; third place, $3,500; and fourth place, $1,750.
Schools eligible for the program met two criteria: 1) they had a recent history of relatively poor performance in the mathematics or English matriculation exams, and 2) the most recent school-level matriculation rate was equal to or lower than the national mean of 45 percent. Though 99 schools met the first criterion, only 49 met the second criterion on the matriculation rate. The program included 629 teachers.
Nearly half of the teachers, 302 of them, won awards-94 in English, 124 in math, 67 in Hebrew and Arabic, and 17 in other subjects. Although the program was designed as an experiment, schools were not assigned at random. Nevertheless, the design of the program enables the implementation of a randomized trial identification strategy which I outline below. The results of the short term effect, presented in Lavy (2009), suggested that teachers' incentives increased students' achievements by increasing the test taking rate as well as the conditional pass rate and test scores in math and English exams. The improvement in these conditional outcomes, which were estimated based on tests and grading external to schools, accounted for more than half of the increase in the unconditional outcomes in math and somewhat less in English. These improvements appear to stem from changes in teaching methods, after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs, and not from artificial inflation or manipulation in test scores. The evidence that suggests that incentives have induced improved effort and pedagogy is important in the context of the recent concern that incentives may have unintended effects, such as "teaching to the test" or cheating and manipulation of test scores, and that they do not generate real learning. However, more conclusive evidence about whether teachers' pay for performance schemes improve real human capital accumulation can only be based on longterm effects, in particular on completed post-secondary schooling, employment, wages, and welfare dependency, which I intend to investigate in this proposal.
Identification and econometric model
The program rules had limited assignment to schools with a 1999 matriculation rate equal to or lower than 45 percent (43 percent for religious and Arab schools). However, the matriculation rate used for assignment was an inaccurate measure of this variable. The data given to administrators were culled from a preliminary and incomplete file of matriculation status. For many students, matriculation status was erroneous as it was based on missing or incorrect information. The Ministry later corrected this preliminary file, as it does every year. 2 As a result, the matriculation rates used for assignment to the program were inaccurate in a majority of schools. This measurement error could be useful for identification of the program effect. In particular, conditional on the true matriculation rate, program status may be virtually randomly assigned due to mistakes in the preliminary file.
This measurement error could be useful for identification of the program's effect. In particular, conditional on the true matriculation rate, program status may be virtually randomly assigned due to mistakes in the preliminary file. Most (80 percent) of the measurement errors were negative, 17 percent were positive, and the rest were free of error. Identification based on the random measurement error can be presented formally as follows:
Let S = S * +  be the error-affected 1999 matriculation rate used for the assignment, where S * represents the correct 1999 matriculation rate and  the measurement error. T denotes participation status, with T = 1 for participants and T = 0 for non-participants. Since T (S) = T (S * +), once we control for S * , assignment to treatment is random ("random assignment" to treatment, conditional on the true value of the matriculation rate). The presence of measurement error creates a natural experiment, where treatment is assigned randomly, conditional on S * , in a sub-sample of the 98 eligible schools. Eighteen of the eligible schools had a correct 1999 matriculation rate above the threshold line. Thus, these schools were "erroneously" chosen for the program. For each of these schools, there is a school with an identical correct matriculation rate but with a draw from the (random) measurement error distribution which is not large (and negative) enough to drop it below the assignment threshold. Such pairing of schools amounts to non-parametrically matching schools on the basis of the value of S S * * . . Therefore, the eighteen untreated schools may be used as a control group that reflects the counterfactual for identification of the effect of the program. The group of 18 treated and 18 control schools are perfectly balanced in student and school characteristics. The following model is used as the basis for regression estimates using the RT sample: 
Data
In this study, I use data from administrative files for the sample of participants in the treatment and allowances, unemployment benefits and disability compensations, and (5) NII records on physical and mental disability. The NII linked these data to students' background data (see Table A1 for descriptive statistics) that I used in Lavy (2009) and cohort of study. I had restricted access to this data at the NII headquarters in Jerusalem.
The post high-school academic schooling system in Israel
The post high-school academic schooling system in Israel includes seven universities (one of which confers only graduate and PhD degrees), over 50 colleges that confer academic undergraduate degrees (some of these also give masters degrees), and dozens of teachers' colleges that confer bachelor of education qualifications. 4 All universities require a Bagrut diploma for enrollment. Most academic and teachers' colleges also require a Bagrut, though some look at specific Bagrut diploma components without requiring full certification. For a given field of study, it is typically more difficult to be admitted to a university than to a college. The national enrollment rates for the cohort of graduating seniors in 1995 (through 2003) was 55.4 percent, of which 27.6 percent were enrolled in universities, 8.5 percent in academic colleges, 7 percent in teachers' colleges, and the rest in non-academic institutions. 5 However, because the treated population is from a low socio-economic background with relatively higher enrollment rates in lower quality postsecondary schooling, we include more detailed decomposition of these type of schooling institutions such as teachers' colleges, practical semi-engineering schools and other non-academic one or two-year colleges. 
Definitions of Outcomes in Adulthood
In this subsection, I describe the outcomes in adulthood for students in the sample.
Labor Market Outcomes:
Earnings: Individual earnings data come from the Israel Tax University Attendance: an indicator for being enrolled for at least one year in university schooling.
Completed years of university schooling is the number of years of attendance.
College Attendance: an indicator for being enrolled for at least one year in academic (3 year) college.
Completed years of college schooling is the number of years of attendance.
Teachers' college attendance, Practical engineering and other vocational schooling Attendance and Any
other non-academic post-secondary schooling are defined accordingly.
Disability and Welfare
Receipt of Eligibility Disability Compensation: An indicator of whether an individual received disability compensation from NII in any year during 2010-2012.
Disability Compensation: Total annual benefits (ILS) of disability compensation. Table 1 presents detailed summary descriptive statistics of the outcome variables for 2011 by treatment and control group and by pre-and post-reform cohorts for the sample that includes the first three quartiles (3Q) of the ability distribution of students. Table 2 presents the respective summary statistics for the full sample (4Q, all four quartiles). Attention is focused on the 3Q sample because these are the students that were mostly affected by the teachers' bonuses program ( The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 show clearly that in the 4Q sample, the mean over all enrollment in post-secondary schooling and in university schooling are higher than in the full sample, and so are the various means of completed years of schooling. This is expected as the students in the fourth quartile Table 1 for the 3Q sample and in Table 2 for the full sample (respective data for 2009 and 2010 are presented in Table A2 and Table A3 ). Focusing again on the treated group in year 2011, we note that 82.7 percent of the 2000 cohort in treated schools in the 3Q sample were employed, earning annually ILS 61,854 ($15,500) on average, and 6.7 percent were unemployed during the year. In the full sample, the respective means are 84.0, 6.7 and ILS 65,015. Regarding the welfare status of individuals in our sample, 1.6 percent and 1.0 percent of the 2000 and 2001 cohorts in treated schools in the 3Q sample, respectively, received physical/mental disability payment, and the respective rates for work related disability are much lower, 0.5 and 0.3 percent.
Descriptive Statistics

Empirical Evidence
Effect on Post-Secondary Schooling Attainment
The program had positive and significant short-term effects on high-school English and Math outcomes at end of high school for students in the first three quartiles of the ability distribution, but had small and insignificant effects on students in the fourth quartile of the ability distribution (Lavy 2009 ). I therefore will focus the analysis on evidence based on the 3Q sample and compare the results to those based on the 4Q sample.
Since the program increased participation rate, average score, and passing rate in the math and
English matriculation exams, we should expect some positive effect on overall summary measures (outcomes) of the matriculation exams such as obtaining a matriculation diploma, total number of matriculation credits, and the average score in the all matriculation exams. Evidence on improvement in these summary achievement measures should lead to an increase in post-secondary enrollment and attainment because they are used as admission criteria for various academic institutions and programs. One would also expect to see some shift away from post-secondary schooling where the admission process places less emphasis on having a passing score in the English and Math matriculation exams, and on obtaining a matriculation certificate. Such post-secondary institutions include one-year and two-year vocational colleges and some of the three-year academic colleges. These achievements are pre-requisites for admission in all seven universities. Table A4 presents results for the short-run impact of the pay for performance experiment on the average matriculation score, on obtaining a matriculation diploma, and other related outcomes on the end of high-school outcomes. In the 3Q sample, the average matriculation score is up by 2.9 points (SE=1.017), and the matriculation rate went up by 5.5 percentage points, which amounts to a 13 percent improvement -a relatively large gain. The average number of credit units increased by 0.669, the number of science credits increased by one third of a unit, and the number of subjects studied at the most advanced level (5 credits) increased by almost one-tenth. The respective estimated effects based on the full sample are similar to those based on the 3Q sample with one exception, the effect on the matriculation rate is half of the effect in 3Q sample (0.026) and it is not significantly different from zero. Table 3 presents results for the long-run impact of the pay for performance experiment on postsecondary schooling attainment. Evidence based on the 3Q sample is presented on columns 1-2 and 5-6.
Evidence based on the full sample is presented in columns 3-4 and 7-8. I distinguish three types of postsecondary education. The first includes the seven research universities in Israel that confer BA, MA and PhD degrees. These schools require a matriculation diploma for admission, an intermediate or advanced matriculation study level in English (while a basic study program in English is sufficient to qualify for a matriculation diploma), and at least one matriculation subject studied at an advanced level. About 35% of all students are enrolled in one of the seven universities. The second type of post-secondary schooling includes over 50 academic colleges that confer only a BA degree and offer mostly social sciences, business, and law degrees. The third group includes teachers' colleges. The fourth group includes two-year practical engineering colleges and the last group includes all other non-academic institutions.
Enrollment in university schooling increased by 4.6 percent in the 3Q sample and this effect is precisely measured (SE=0.010). This gain, relative to the control group mean of 10.2 percent, is a 45 percent increase. The increase in enrolment led to a 0.183 increase in completed years of university schooling, reflecting a dramatic 63 percent increase relative to the baseline mean of 0.291 years of university schooling.
The relative gain in university enrollment and in the respective completed years of schooling are of similar magnitude, both being very large relative to the impact of any other educational intervention or policy change, for example in comparison to the gain due to an increase in compulsory schooling.
The results based on the full sample are similar to the results based on the 3Q sample. University enrollment increased by 5.5 percent and completed years of university schooling increased by 0.25 years.
The relative magnitude of these gains is also similar to those based on the 3Q sample. However, the effect on academic-college enrollment and years of schooling estimated with the full sample are strikingly different than those obtained using the 3Q sample. While the effect on enrollment in academic colleges of students in the 3Q sample is zero, the effect in the full sample is negative, large and almost completely offsets the increase in university enrollment in the 3Q sample. This results means that the teachers' PFP program expanded the extensive margin of post-secondary schooling of students who are up to the 75 th percentile of the ability distribution, while in the 4Q sample I find a compositional shift: an increase in university enrollment and in years of schooling that are almost fully offset by a reduction in enrollment and years of schooling in academic college education. This pattern obviously reflects the pattern of offsetting effect (an increase in university schooling and a decline in other forms of post-secondary schooling) of the program on students in the fourth quartile of ability.
Effect on Earnings and Employment
I next present estimates of the effect of the program on annual earnings at around age 28-30. These results are presented in Note that the gain in annual earnings is relative to a small increase in mean years of schooling (a 0.074 increase in years of schooling in the 3Q sample and close to zero respective gain in the Q4 sample), but a much larger increase in university schooling. Therefore, the increase in earnings perhaps reflects not only the increase in mean schooling, but also a change in the composition of post-secondary education, with a larger component of university schooling and a smaller component of academic college. The implied mechanism that explains part of the earnings gain is, therefore, a positive effect of the teachers' incentive experiment on the quality of post-secondary schooling. The better access to higher quality post-secondary education is mediated through the range of improvements in high-school educational outcomes, which allowed affected students to switch from academic colleges to universities, and perhaps also enroll in more selective programs that lead to a higher return to schooling. Another very realistic explanation for the large earning gain is the direct effect of the improved matriculation outcomes on earnings, independently of the effect they have on university years of schooling. Particularly important is the matriculation rate, which increased under the program by 2-5 percent. There is a return in the labor market of about 13 per cent to those having a matriculation diploma, independently of the effect of a matriculation diploma on postsecondary schooling. 9 Similarly, the quality improvements in the matriculation study program (as reflected in the composite score, number of credit units and credits in honor and science subjects) could also be rewarded in the labor market beyond their effect on post-secondary schooling. The conclusion from these results is that high-school outcomes are indeed correlated with earnings.
However, a more firm conclusion about how much of the program's effect is due to improvement in these outcomes can be drawn by examining whether the estimated effect of school choice on post-secondary attainment and earnings disappears when we control for Bagrut outcomes. This is an informal test of whether school choice affects post-secondary attainment and earnings at adulthood through any channel other than these Bagrut outcomes. Of course, this analysis and its results are only suggestive because the Bagrut outcomes are endogenous and potentially correlated with the error term in the long term regression equations.
In panel A of Table 6 , I present estimates of the coefficient of the teachers' incentives program treatment effect in a DID regression that includes also the high-school outcomes as explanatory variables, In panel B of Table 6 , I present similar evidence with regard to annual earnings, based on the 3Q and full samples. Again, the treatment effect of teachers' incentives clearly falls each time we add one of the high-school Bagrut achievement measures. For example, based on the 4Q sample, it falls by 35 percent when the average matriculation score is added, by 10 percent when the matriculation diploma is added, by 30 percent when number of credits is added, and by 29 when the number of Bagrut subjects studied at the most advanced level is added. When all five are added, the original treatment estimate, ILS 3,329, falls to ILS 1,817 (column 7, panel B), a 45 percent decline, and it is no longer significantly different from zero. The evidence from the 3Q sample is qualitatively similar, when all five outcomes are added to the DID regression, the effect of teachers' incentives on earnings declines by 40 percent, from ILS 4,442 to ILS 2,696, and the treatment estimate is no longer statistically significant.
In column 6, I present regressions where I control only for the outcomes of the math and English matriculation exams. These outcomes are the score in the English and math exams and the test taking rate in each of these two subjects. This is an interesting exercise because these four outcomes were directly targeted by the teachers' pay for performance experiment, especially in the 3Q sample. Focusing on the sensitivity of the effect of the program on earnings (panel B of Table 6 ), it is clear that adding these controls lowers the treatment estimate in the 3Q sample more than adding any of the four overall Bagrut outcomes. The estimates in the full sample reveal a somewhat different pattern, as adding the two directly affected math and English outcomes lowers more the earnings treatment estimated effect only in comparison to adding the number of matriculation credits or the number of advanced level matriculation subjects.
correlated with the high school matriculation outcomes.
In column 9, I report treatment effect estimates when I also add university enrollment and completed years of schooling as controls. Adding these two additional controls lowers the earnings treatment effect further. The overall decline is now 56 percent in the full sample and 44 percent in the 3Q sample. These results clearly indicate that the gain in earnings in adulthood is mediated to large extent by the gains in the measured high-school and post-secondary schooling outcomes. Table 4 The proportion in the sample that received unemployment benefits is 7.9 percent in 2009, 6.9 percent in 2010 and 6.7 in 2011 (fourth row in Table 4 ). These rates are very similar to the national average unemployment rate in 2010 and 2011 in the 25-34 age groups, which was 7.4 and 6.8 percent, respectively.
The estimated treatment effect on the probability of receiving unemployment benefits in these three years is -0.011 (SE=0.009), 0.015 (SE=0.009) and -0.017 (SE=0.008), respectively. The effect in 2011 is negative and significantly different from zero. In the third row of Table, it is 89 ILS and in 2011 it is -10 ILS. None of these estimates are statistically different from zero.
Effect on Disability Status and Allowance
11 I also estimated the treatment effects using a sample where the data of all three years were stacked together. The results from this estimation are very similar to the evidence presented in Tables 3-4 , but I prefer to present the year specific estimates because they show how the experimental effect changes with age. Table 7 presents the estimated effect of the teachers' pay for performance program on physicalmental disability eligibility rates and on the average disability welfare transfer. The level of such transfer is an increasing function of the disability rate, which is determined individually for each claimant by an NII committee that includes a doctor and a social worker. The proportion of individuals in 2011 for the 3Q sample of the 2000 cohort in treated schools who received physical or mental disability allowance is 1.6 percent (column 1 in Table 7 ). The mean monthly disability allowance is 445 ILS.
In columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 7 , I report the DID estimates of the effect of teachers' incentives on each of these two outcomes. Focusing on results based on the 3Q sample suggests that this intervention and found evidence to suggest that as the value of labor-market participation increases, disability program participation falls. The elasticity of payments with respect to local earnings is between -0.3 and -0.7, depending on the disability program, and it is higher for permanent than for transitory economic shocks.
Several potential mechanisms can account for the large effect of the teachers' incentive program on disability status and eligibility for related welfare allowances. First, gaining disability status is often related to manipulative behavior of individuals' vis-à-vis NII staff. For example, individuals who want to avoid the military draft may opt to gain NII disability status ('back' problems is a well-known excuse for this purpose).
If school choice increased the draft (by increasing schooling quality, for example, which may increase motivation for the draft, or by increasing the range of options during the military service), it could have indirectly reduced the motivation to seek disability status. A more direct channel is through the effect of school choice on education and on the opportunity cost of time. Eligibility for NII disability allowance involves restrictions on employment and earnings, and the incentive program makes these restrictions more costly to individuals, lowering the financial gain from disability status. This mechanism is in line with the finding of Black, Kermit, and Sanders (2002) , suggesting that better labor-market opportunities reduce disability program participation.
I also examine eligibility and disability allowance for disability cases caused by an accident at work.
The higher schooling attainment and quality could have reduced treated students' entry into the manual labor force which has a higher risk of accidents, and it could also reduce directly the probability of a work related accident by improving productivity and safer work practices. The proportion of individuals in the 2000 sample who received such work related disability welfare transfer in 2011 is 0.4 percent (column 1 in Table   7 ), and this rate was similar in 2010 and 2009. The mean monthly welfare allowance for this type of disability is 102 ILS for the 2000 students in treated schools (column 1 in Table 7 
Conclusions
In this paper, I study the long term effect of an experiment that paid teachers additional salary based on their students' performance in high stakes exams at the end of high-school. All studies of teachers' incentive programs and the vast majority of published research on the impact of other school interventions has examined their effects on short-run outcomes, primarily by looking at their impact on standardized test
scores. This study is the first to follow students from high-school to adulthood to examine the impact of a teachers' pay for performance scheme on long-run life outcomes. Such an analysis can address the critical question of whether an education policy intervention can achieve the ultimate goal of improving lifetime well-being. This research has also the advantage of focusing on a particular intervention that targets improvement in teaching quality and therefore can provide clear policy guidance, relative to more generally defined measures such as teachers' value added measures.
The evidence presented above shows that more than a decade after the initial intervention occurred, treated individuals experienced sizable gains in schooling attainment and quality, large increases in annual earnings, some of which reflect a return to education quality beyond the return to years of schooling, and an economically meaningful reduction in dependency on welfare income, such as unemployment insurance, disability benefits and welfare transfers.
These results are relevant and important for education policy in developed and developing countries as merit pay and incentive based pay for teachers is being implemented or contemplated in many countries. hugely controversial: on March 26 2014, the National Union of Teachers struck in protest of the overall inpay structures that are due to begin later in the year. Notes : This table presents the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Teachers' Bonuses program on post-secondary schooling for the three-and four-quartiles samples described in the paper. Columns 1-4 measure enrollment into different types of post-secondary institutions, while columns 5-8 measure completed years of post-secondary education by institution type. The results are for the year of 2011. The variable "Any PostSecondary Education" comprises all of the different post-secondary institutions reported together. Columns 1,3,5, and 7 represent the means and standard deviations for the 2000 cohort in treated schools. These cohorts did not receive the treatment so it is useful to compare their averages as a benchmark for the treatment effect. Columns 2,4,6, and 8 report the differences-in-differences estimates for each of the dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the school year level. 
Outcomes 2011 Outcomes
Notes : This table presents the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of theTeachers' Bonuses program on different employment and income outcomes. Panel A and Panel B report the results for the three-quartile and four-quartile samples described in the paper, respectively. Columns 1-2 report results for 2011, columns 3-4 report results for 2010, and columns 5-6 report results for 2009. The variable "Employment Indicator" receives the value of 1 if the individual has any work record for the given year, and 0 otherwise. The variable "Received Unemployment Insurance Benefits Indicator" Receives the value of 1 if the individual has any record indicating that he received any amount of unemployment benefits in the given year, and 0 otherwise. The variable "Total Unemployment Insurance Benefits Received" describes the total NIS amount of unemployment benefits the individual received in the given year. Average Annual Earnings measure the total NIS amount of earnings the individual received in the given year. Columns 1,3, and 5 report the means and standard deviations for the 2000 cohort in the treated schools. This cohort did not receive the treatment so it is useful to compare their averages as a benchmark for the treatment effect. Columns 2,4, and 5 report the differences-in-differences estimates for each of the dependent variables listed above. Standard errors are clustered at the school year level. 
Annual Earnings
Notes : This table presents OLS relationships between high school matriculation outcomes, college schooling, and earnings at adulthood for the four-quartiles sample described in the paper. Column 1 reports means and standard deviations for the 2000 Cohort in Treated Schools. Column 2 represents the OLS estimate of a regression where the dependent variable is the annual wage for year 2011 and the independent variables include the same variables as reported in tables 3-4, in addition to the high-school outcome variables described in the table. Column 3 reports the OLS estimate when all the high-school outcomes variables that appear in Panel A\B are controlled for in the wage regression in addition to the rest of the control variables from tables 3-4. Column 4 reports the OLS estimate from a wage regression where all the explanatory variables in the 
Added Control Variables
Notes : This table demonstrates the sensitivity of the treatment effect as measured in tables 3 and 4 to high school educational outcomes. Column 1 reports the estimated treatment effects from tables 3 and 4 according to the relevant sample and dependent variable. Columns 2-6 present the estimated treatement effect when the high school educational outcome variable mentioned in the column header is added to the differences-in-differences regression estimated in table 3 or 4. Column 7 present the estimated treatement effect when all five high school educational outcomes are added to the differences-in-differences regression estimated in table 3 or 4 simultaneously. Column 8 adds university education to the wage regression, and column 9 includes both high-school and university variables. Standard errors are clustered at the school year level. Notes : This table presents the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Teachers' Bonuses program on different disability rate outcomes. Panel A and Panel B report the results for the three quartile and four quartile samples described in the paper, respectively. Columns 1-2 report results for 2011, columns 3-4 report results for 2010, and columns 5-6 report results for 2009. The variable "Received Disability Insurance Benefits" receives the value of 1 is the individual received any amount of diability benefits from the national insurance institution of Israel (NII), 0 otherwise. The variable "Total Disability Insurance Benefits Received" describes the total NIS amount of disability insurance benefits the individual received in the given year. Columns 1,3, and 5 report the means and standard deviations for the 2000 cohort in the treated schools. This cohort did not receive the treatment so it is useful to compare its' average as a benchmark for the treatment effect. Columns 2,4, and 6 report the differences-in-differences estimates for each of the dependent variables listed above. Standard errors are clustered at the school year level. Notes : This table presents the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Teachers' Bonuses program on high-school educational outcomes fo the three and for quartiles samples described in the paper. Columns 1 and 3 report the means and standard deviations for the 2000 cohort in the treated schools. This cohort did not receive the treatment so it is useful to compare its' average as a benchmark for the treatment effect. Columns 2 and 4 report the differences-in-differences estimates for each of the dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the school year level.
